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LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
QurIcY W1UGHT*
BACKGROUND
The Middle Eastern problem which led to the six-day war in June, 1968, began in
1915 when Turkey entered World War I as an ally of Germany, and the Allies in
order to gain Arab support decided to end Turkish rule in the Arab cofintries. By
the MacMahon agreement of 1915 with Sharif Husayn of Mecca,' the British prom-
ised to recognize the independence of the Arab states in the Middle East; but by the
Sykes-Picot agreement with France2 in the same year, they promised to recognize a
French sphere in Syria and Lebanon along with a British sphere in Iraq and
Palestine (including Trans-Jordan), and by the Balfour Declaration of November 2,
I9x7,' they promised a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine.
The Treaty of Versailles included the League of Nations Covenant, which pro-
vided in the article dealing with mandates (article 22), that "Certain communities
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" should be "provisionally recognized [as
independent nations] subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance
by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." It further provided
that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the
selection of the Mandatory." Even before peace was finally made with Turkey by
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924, the League of Nations Council confirmed the
Middle Eastern mandates4 which the Allied powers had assigned in the San Remo
Conference of April, i92o, in accord with the Sykes-Picot agreement, without regard
to the wishes of the inhabitants. These wishes had been indicated in the suppressed
report of the King-Crane Mission sent to the area by President Wilson.5
The Arab countries accepted the mandatories without enthusiasm. In Palestine
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the relations of some 9ooooo Arabs with iooooo Jewso were moderately good during
most of the 192os after the British had interpreted the provision in their Mandate,
which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, as not applying to Trans-Jordan,
originally a part of the Palestine mandate, and as not intending a Jewish state but
a Jewish community in Palestine with free access to Jewish religious sites, and assuring
full protection for the rights of the Arab population. Jewish and Arab villages
adjacent to each other cooperated, Jews instructed the Arabs on industrial technology
and the Arabs instructed the Jews on agriculture under local conditions.
In the x93os as Jewish immigration increased, especially after Hider began his
persecution of Jews and as the Jews acquired more land, Arab anxieties increased.
Disputes arose over immigration regulations, religious sites (the Wailing Wall, 1929),
land ownership, and the position of the Zionist organization in Palestine, leading to
a violent Arab revolt in 1936. A British Commission in 1937 (Peel)' proposed
partition of Palestine between a Jewish state and an Arab area to become part of
Trans-Jordan, but this was not implemented because of Arab objections.
After World War II, conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine became more
intense. The Zionists, both within and outside Palestine, demanded a Jewish state
as proposed by the Peel Commission. The British Government made several efforts
at conciliation including a promise, in the Chamberlain White Paper of 1939,8 that
immigration would be restricted so as never to permit more than one-third of the
Palestine population to be Jewish, and a provisional promise of independence in
ten years. This was unacceptable to the Zionists and on April 2, 1947, Britain
indicated its intent to resign the mandate and turn the problem over to the United
Nations General Assembly.' That body recommended on November 29, 1947, over
Arab protests, a division of Palestine into a Jewish state of Israel and an Arab state,
linked by economic institutions for customs union, common currency, and common
regulation of irrigation, transport, and communication. 0 A division of revenues to
elevate the lower economic level of the Arabs and internationalization of Jerusalem
and surrounding territories including most of the holy sites were also proposed.
This recommendation accorded with the majority report 6f the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)" earlier established by the General
Assembly to study the problem. A minority report had recommended a federation
but the majority thought this would require more cooperation between Jews and
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Arabs in Palestine than was available, because of radical disagreement on the issue
of immigration. The Zionists accepted the Partition Plan but the Arabs prepared
for armed resistance. Hostilities occurred within Palestine in the winter of 1947.
Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948,12 and was promptly recognized by
the United States, the Soviet Union, and other states. Neighboring Arab states
opened hostilities against it, were defeated, and half a million Arabs fled from
Israel. Count Folke Bernadotte, president of the Swedish Red Cross, was sent by
the United Nations as mediator. He concluded temporary truces but was assassinated
in the summer of 1948 by Jewish terrorists. Further hostilities took place in the
fall of 1948 and Israel's representative in the United Nations, while insisting in the
General Assembly that the territory awarded it by the United Nations resolution of
November 29, 1947, was the minimum to which Israel was entitled, declared that, in
view of the Arab refusal to accept the award and invasion across the boundary,
Israel was free to continue its occupations resulting from the war until such time as
a permanent boundary was negotiated, and in any case it would not withdraw from
the parts of Jerusalem it had occupied nor accept the internationalization of that
city proposed in the United Nations resolution of 1947 and reaffirmed in several
resolutions 13  Ralph Bunche of the United Nations Secretariat, who had succeeded
Count Bernadotte as mediator, concluded armistice agreements in 1949 between
Israel and each of its Arab neighbors, the last on July 20, I949,'" all at approximately
the line of the Israeli occupation. These lines embraced fifty per cent more territory
than had been accorded to Israel by the United Nations resolution of 1947."n The
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), already in existence, was
continued to supervise the observance of the armistice agreements.16
Frequent violations of these agreements came before the Security Council during
the next years, culminating in a large-scale invasion of the Sinai Peninsula by Israel
in i956, followed by Anglo-French operations against Egypt because of its nationaliza-
tion of the Suez Canal. An American-proposed resolution, implying that Israel was
the aggressor, was vetoed in the Security Council by Great Britain and France '
The problem was then turned over to the General Assembly under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution of i95o and, with vigorous support from the United States and
the Soviet Union, the General Assembly succeeded in bringing about a cease-fire,
withdrawal of Israeli, British and French forces to their positions before hostilities,
and the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Egyptian
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territory south of the cease-fire line.?8 Egypt agreed to the opening of the Straits of
Tiran to Israeli shipping to its port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba.19 After 1957,
breaches of the cease-fire line on the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian frontiers con-
tinued to come before the Security Council which usually passed a resolution criti-
cizing the excessive Israeli retaliation against minor Arab raids.
Against this background a new crisis arose in i967, with increased border raids
in April, President Nasser's demand on May i6 for withdrawal of the United
Nations Emergency Force from Egyptian territory, and his declaration on May 23
dosing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.20 According to David G. Nes, deputy
chief of the American Embassay in Cairo, Nasser took these actions because he had
intelligence reports from Syria and the Soviet Union warning of intensive Israeli
build-ups on the Syrian frontier. The American Embassy on the basis of its own
intelligence reports advised the Egyptian foreign ministry that there was no truth
in these reports as, indeed, Nasser later recognized, but Egypt, at the time, believed
that the United States was covering up for Israel and proceeded with defensive
measures. It strengthened its alliances with Jordan and Syria and moved forces into
the Aqaba area, the Israeli frontiers in Sinai, and the Gaza strip, although it declared
that it would not attack unless Israel launched an armed attack against its Arab
neighbors. According to Mr. Nes, if the United States had paid more attention to
Egypt's requests for economic aid during the preceding eleven months and had
attempted to demonstrate to Nasser "that we were not hostile" to him, we might have
been able to dissuade him from the action which led to war. "Nobody in Washing-
ton," he said, "was willing- to take the political risk involved in doing anything for
Egypt. 'u
President Johnson characterized Nes's view as "parochial"2 2 but on June i9 he
expressed a broad view of the situation suggesting that a blocking of the Gulf of Aqaba
was illegal and that it was traditional American policy to support the independence
and territorial integrity of all Middle Eastern states, that peace in the Middle East
required opening the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, a solution of the refugee prob-
lem, and an end of Arab belligerency against Israel'3
II
THE Pos1TIoNs OF THE BELLiGERENTs
According to Israel, as indicated in the United Nations debate, the 1967 crisis
began in April with increased Arab violations of Israeli territory, Syrian pressure
18 Developments of 1956-1957 summarized in EvER.hmAN's UNITED NATIONS: A BASIC HISToRY op
THE ORGANIZATION 1945 TO 1963, at 81-89 (United Nations, New York, N.Y., 7th ed. n.d.)
" Further on the international waterways, see Sec. IV, H and I, infra pp. 20-22.
"
0 See, e.g., reports by Secretary-General to the Security Council, U.N. Does. S/7896, May i9, 1967,
and S/ 7 9o6, May 26, 1967.2 N.Y. Tunes, Feb. 9, 1968, at 3, col. 4., See also notes ilo, 115, x16 infra.
22 Id.
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with Egyptian support, and Nasser's defensive alliance with Jordan, manifesting a
policy of encirclement of Israel by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Mobilizations and
movements of forces to the area from Algeria, Iraq, and Kuwait; Nasser's continuous
affirmation that a state of war existed with Israel and had existed since 1948; his
continued declaration of a policy to restore Palestine to the Arabs and'to terminate
the existence of Israel-all added to the latter's anxiety. Nasser's demand on May i6
that the United Nations Emergency Force which had kept moderate peace on the
Egyptian frontier since 1957 be withdrawn, Secretary-General U Thant's compliance
with this demand on May 18, Nasser's declaration closing the Straits of Tiran and
the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping on May 22, and Nasser's movement of forces
into the Aqaba and Sinai areas constituted, in Israel's opinion, clear evidence of
aggression. Israel, however, asserted that it withheld its attack on Egyptian forces in
Sinai on June 5 until its territory had been attacked on the ground and in the air.24
According to Egypt and other Arab countries, in the United Nations debate, the
basic problem was the planting of Zionism in Palestine by colonialism to serve
colonial interests, and Israel's constant aggressive policy of territorial expansion,
together with the expulsion of the indigenous population. Recent provocations had
induced the Arab states to cooperate to defend the Arab nation by all measures.
The Egyptian request for the removal of UNEF and its closure of the Gulf of
Aqaba were said to be within the domestic jurisdiction of Egypt and designed
to restore the situation to what it had been before 1956. In any case, they were
considered permissible acts in view of the state of war which existed between Israel
and the three legitimate littoral states on the Gulf, a situation not affected by the
armistice. In fact, the very use of the term "armistice" was said to imply a state of
war. Egypt asserted that peace required "a total respect for the Palestine Arab
people." It declared, however, that it did not contemplate any offensive action and
insisted that it had not taken any such action until attacked by Israel assisted by the
United States and Great Britain on June 5, 1967.25
III
UNITED NATIONS AcTioN
The United Nations Security Council met on request of Canada and Denmark
continuously from May 24 to June 14, 1967, and put the Middle Eastern situation
on its agenda over the opposition of the Soviet Union, Bulgarian and Mali delegates.
It invited the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Israel to attend, and later Jordan,
2
'U.N. Docs. S/PV.1342, May 24, 1967, at 41-45; S/PV.i 3 4 3 , May 29, 1967, at 62-72; S/PV.1348,
June 6, 1967, at 71-91 Israel later in effect admitted that its air forces had invaded Egyptian territory
before the Egyptian attack. See note 112 infra.
2 U.N. Docs. S/PV.1343, May 29, 1967, at 21-47 (UAR); S/PV.13 4 4, May 20, 1968, at 17-46 (Syria);
S/PV.1345, May 31, 1968, at 27-50 (Jordan). In an interview in March r968, Nasser said that his
charge that Israel was assisted by the United States was due to a misunderstanding based on suspicion and
faulty information. Attwood, Nasser Talks, LooK, March 19, 1968, at 63; N.Y. Times, March 5, 1968,
at x, col. 3.
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Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia 6 It
also discussed the problem on July 8 and 9 and October 25, on request of Israel and
the United Arab Republic, to consider violations of the cease-fire, and on Novem-
ber 9-22, on request of the UA.R., to examine principles and procedures for settlement
of the conflict.
The General Assembly met in emergency session on June 17, after Israel had
declared the annexation of Jordanian Jerusalem, and continued discussion of the
situation through July. On July 4 it passed a resolution (ii6-o-2) declaring Israel's
attempt to change the status of Jerusalem was invalid and calling on it to renounce its
action.27 It also passed a resolution on the same day (99-2o-o) calling on the parties
to observe humanitarian principles and human rights. On July 21 it requested
the Secretary-General to report its debates to the Security Council, which should
resume consideration of the situation as a matter of urgency (63-26-27) 9
The discussions in the Security Council indicated wide differences of opinion about
responsibility for the crisis and the hostilities. The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, France and
Mali, as well as the Arab states, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, supported the United
Arab Republic's position urging that Israel be found guilty of aggression and that
no other aspects of the problem be considered until Israel had withdrawn from the
territory that it had occupied as the result of the hostilities. India, Nigeria, and
Ethiopia agreed on the latter position but the United States, Great Britain, Brazil,
Canada, and Denmark thought that a cease-fire should be established first without
consideration of responsibility for initiation of the crisis and that withdrawal from
the occupied territories should be contingent on settlement of other aspects of the
conflict. They suggested that restoration of the situation which bad led to three
instances of serious hostility since 1948 was not a proper solution. They did not,
however, support the Israeli contention that the U.A.R. was responsible, nor Israel's
suggestion that bi-lateral negotiations between Israel and each of its Arab neighbors
was the only way to establish peace in the area. The United States representative,
Arthur Goldberg, supported a suggestion in Secretary-General U Thant's report of
May 26, 1967,'o that the first step was agreement on a "breathing spell to allow
tension to subside from its present explosive level." After that, he thought efforts
should be made to deal in longer-range terms with detailed points of tension which
the Secretary-General had identified in his report.3 '
The Council was unable to pass any resolutions before hostilities broke out on
June 5, but passed several after that date providing for and implementing a cease-
"'For record of the proceedings see U.N. Docs. S/PV.i 3 4 x-136x, May 24-June,14, 1967. Sum.
maries in 21 I;T'L ORG. 837-861 (1967); 4 U.N. Mo-I..LY Ctox., No. 6, at 5-26<6W I No. 7, at 4-32
(1967).
2? G.A. Res. 2253, 5th Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp. 1, at 4, U.N. Doec. A/6798 (i 67).
"' G.A. Res. 2252, id. at 3-
"G.A. Res. 2256, id. at 4.
'0 See note 20 supra.
" U.N. Doc. S/PV.13 4 3 , May 29. 1967, at 7-21.
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fire;3 2 and calling for the protection of civilians in occupied territory a These
resolutions were all passed unanimously. During the debate, the Soviet repre-
sentative intimated that the Socialist countries would take measures to effect
the withdrawal of Israeli occupation if the United Nations failed to act3 4 It
seems to have been somewhat placated by the unanimous passage bn November
=. of a resolution35 introduced by Great Britain providing for the presence of
a United Nations mediator in the area to seek conciliation on the basis of principles
resembling those stated by President Johnson in an address of June 19, I967,3" and
recognizing that, eventually, territory occupied by Israel should be evacuated and
claims of a state of belligerency by the Arabs terminated.
IV
LEGAL IssuEs
Among thirteen legal problems involved in the Middle Eastern situation, one,
(i) the validity of the Balfour Declaration, arose in World War I. Eight arose
in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49; they include (2) the partition of Palestine, (3) the
status of Jerusalem, (4) the legality of Arab belligerency, (5) the boundaries of
Israel, (6) the use of Jordan waters, (7) the rights of Palestinian refugees, (8) Israel's
rights of navigation in the Suez Canal, and (9) freedom of navigation through the
Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba. Four additional problems arose in the
crisis of 1967: (io) the status of the United Nations Emergency Force, (II) the obliga-
tion of Israel to evacuate occupied territory, (2) the responsibilities of the United
Nations and the Great Powers, and (i) the responsibility for initiation of the six-day
war. This large and unlucky number of problems means that each can be dealt
with only briefly and somewhat categorically.
A. Balfour Declaration
The Arabs claimed that the Balfour Declaration, which provided a national home
for the Jewish people in Palestine, and its incorporation in the British Mandate for
Palestine, confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922, constituted an imperialistic
demarche designed to infiltrate a country which had been Arab for centuries with
a European population and to assure British dominance in the area adjacent to the
Suez Canal, which would be strategically important to Britain if its occupation and
protectorate of Egypt should come to an end. Furthermore, the Arabs claimed that
the Declaration was contrary to agreements made with the Arabs to gain their support
in the war against Turkey during the First World War. Also, the wishes of the
inhabitants were not consulted in awarding the Mandate for Palestine to Great
"S.C. Res. 233 (1967); S.C. Res. 234 (1967); S.C. Res. 235 (1967); S.C. Res. 236 (1967).
38 S.C. Res. 237 (1967).
"t U.N. Doc. S/PV.1353, June 9, 1967, at 27-31.
" S.C. Res. 242 (1967). For text, see Rosenne, in this symposium, pp. 44, 56.
so 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 31, 33-34 (1967).
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Britain as was required by the League of Nations Covenant. The latter points were
supported by some British in the Middle East, such as Colonel T. E. Lawrence and
Miss Gertrude Bell, who believed that the Arabs had been double-crossed.
The motives for the Balfour Declaration a appear to have been mixed. Gratitude
for Jewish support in the war, especially for the chemical experiments of Chaim
Weizmann, the head of the Zionist organization, and belief in the legitimacy of the
cultural interests of the Jews in Palestine, as well as strategic consideration for British
interests in the Middle East, especially to counteract French interests in Lebanon
and Syria, were involved. The meaning of the MacMahon agreements of 191588 has
been controversial. The British contend that in promising to support independent
Arab states, Palestine was excluded.89 The Allies, including the United States,
recognized the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. Furthermore, the
Arab leaders accepted them after Trans-Jordan had been excluded from the national
home provision and after the Churchill White Paper of i9224° had interpreted the
meaning of the "national home," not as a Jewish state of Palestine but as a cultural
community in Palestine, and had emphasized the British intention to assure protection
for the Arab inhabitants and for the three religions interested in Palestine, as required
by both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. British policy observed these com-
mitments during the I92OS and the relations between the Arab majority and the
Jewish minority were on the whole friendly. 4' However justified the Arab protest
against the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate may have been in i919, the
issue had become moot before 1947 because the legality of the conditions they estab-
lished had been recognized by most states, including the Arab states, for many years
and had been confirmed in the United Nations Charter (article 8o).'
Only after the large immigration of Jews into Palestine, especially as the result of
Hider's persecutions, was there serious conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine
and serious anxieties among surrounding states. The Jewish demand for partition and
creation of a Jewish state increased Arab alarm and revived objections to the Balfour
Declaration.
B. Partition of Palestine
The legality of the General Assembly's recommendation for partition of Palestine
was doubtful. Many Zionists had always wanted a Jewish state of Palestine in spite
37 See note 3 supra.
s See note I supra.
"See, e.g., C. SYKEaS, CRosSRoADS To IsRAEL 63-65 (x965).
,0 See note 6 supra.
I 'Wright, supra note 6.
"'All systems of law provide means such as prescription, general recognition, statutes of limitation,
agreements by the interested parties, and legislation, by which situations which originated in illegality
become moot or acquire a legal status. The principle ius ex injuria non oritur (rights do not arise from
wrongs) mist be balanced by the principle ex lactir jus oritur (rights arise from facts), especially in the
society of nations which is often unable to rectify wrongs and is faced by a general interest that disputes
be terminated. See H. LAurmpAcirr, RECoGNrTO IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 427 (1947); Wright, Recog-
nition, Intervention, and Ideologies, 7 INDIAN Y.13. INTL AFa. 89, 95 (1958).
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of the acceptance by'Chaim Weizmann, Judah Magnes, and other Zionist leaders, of
the British concept of a cultural rather than a political Jewish home in Palestine. A
Jewish state was, however, increasingly demanded by the Zionists, as the need for
a haven from Hitler's persecutions developed in the 193os, and as the antagonism
between Arabs and Jews in Palestine increased with the flood of immigration.
The United Nations Charter provided that mandated territories might be placed
under trusteeship (article 77) by agreement of the states directly concerned including
the mandatory power (article 79). But the following article added:
[N]othing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner
the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing inter-
national instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be
parties.
The reference to "peoples" in the article seems to have been primarily designed to
protect the rights of the Jewish people to a national home in Palestine under the
Mandate, but the term also applied to the Arabs in Palestine. The Mandate provided
for "safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine,
irrespective of race and religion" (article 2).
When Britain, despairing of any settlement of the Palestine problem, declared in
February 1967 that it would give up the Mandate and withdraw from Palestine by
August I, 1948 (later changed to May 14) and placed the problem before the United
Nations General Assembly, the Arabs at once claimed that no change in the Mandate
was permissible without the consent of the Arab people of Palestine. The General
Assembly's committee,43 however, recommended the partition of the territory with
economic union, and permanent internationalization of Jerusalem and surrounding
territory containing most of the religious sites. The Arabs objected and demanded
an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the compatibility of
this action with the Charter (article 8o) .44 This demand was rejected by the com-
mittee by a vote of 2o to 21 with 13 abstentions.45 France favored submission to the
Court, the United States and the Soviet Union opposed it, and the United Kingdom
and China abstained. The General Assembly then accepted the committee's recom-
mendation on November 29, 1947, by a vote of 33 to 13 with io abstentions.46 The
United States, the Soviet Union and France voted "aye" and the United Kingdom
and China abstained. It was argued that the General Assembly had full power to
deal with Palestine because Great Britain, as Mandatory, had under the Mandate
(article i) "full powers of legislation and administration, save as they may be limited
by the terms of the mandate" and had transferred these broad powers to the General
" See text accompanying note xi supra.
442 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on the Palestinian Question 299-301, U.N. Doc. A/AC.14/32
(1947)-
'lid. at 203.
462 U.N. GAOR 1424-425 (947).
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Assembly, which had succeeded to the League of Nations Council in ultimate sover-
eignty of mandated territories.4  Furthermore, article 8o of the Charter, in declaring
that the Chapter on Trusteeship could not "in or of itself" alter the rights of "peoples"
under the Mandate, did not preclude modifications of these rights by permissible
action. 8
Recognizing that there might be difficulties in implementing its resolution, the
General Assembly "requested" the Security Council to "determine, as a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with article 39 of the
Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the resolution."
The Security Council, however, refused to authorize enforcement measures. The
principal proponent of this course, the United States Representative (Austin), main-
tained that the Charter authorized the Council to take such measures only to preserve
international peace, not to enforce a political settlement in the mandated territory.
He considered the Plan of Partition to be a recommendation of the Council.4
In view of the terms of the Mandate and the apparent intent of article 8o of
the Charter to protect the rights of all the peoples of Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs
seem to have had a good legal case, though it is unfortunate that an Advisory Opinion
was not obtained on the issue. If the General Assembly's resolution could not be
regarded as authoritative, but as a recommendation ignoring its responsibility under
article 8o of the Charter, and if Great Britain was unable, as it said it was, to meet
its responsibility as Mandatory to protect the rights of the Arab peoples, forcible
resistance to partition by the Arabs of Palestine should be regarded as civil strife
within the domestic jurisdiction of Palestine in which outside states should not inter-
vene, and in which the United Nations should intervene only if the situation
threatened international peace and security.50 Under this interpretation, however, the
Arab states outside of Palestine acted contrary to their obligations under the Charter
in intervening in Palestine as they did.6 ' In view, however, of the obvious threat,
indeed breach of international peace, the Security Council should have acted before
"7T. LIE, IN Tim CAUSE OF PEAcE 167 (1954); Q. WRIor, MANDATES UNDERt THE L-AGu OF
NATIONS 528-30 (1930). On the question of sovereignty of mandated territories, see more generally
id. at 313-537.
"' See also on the partition of Palestine, EVEmSLYAN'S UNrrn NATIONS, supra note z8, at 70-71; Wright,
Interventions, z956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 264-66 (x957).
3 U.N. SCOR "53d meeting 265-67 (948).
0 In accordance with articles 2(7) and 39 of the Charter. See Wright, International Law and Civil
Strife, 1959 PROCEEDINGS, Am. Soc'Y ITrr'L L. 145, 149-5I; The Legality of Intervention Under the
United Nations Charter, 1957 id. at 79, 83-85; United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 Am. J.
INT'L L. 112, 1x9-25 (1959); Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation, 6o id. at 750, 754-55 (1966).
"On May 15, 1948, the Arab states declared that they "were compelled to intervene for the sole pur-
pose of restoring peace and security and establishing law and order in Palestine" because "peace and order
have been completely upset" there, constituting "a serious and direct threat to peace and security within
the territories of the Arab states themselves." Furthermore, "the security of Palestine is a sacred trust
for them," "the spread of disorder and lawlessness to neighboring Arab lands" must be prevented and
"the vacuum 'created by the termination of the mandate and the failure to replace it by any legally
constituted authority" must be filled. 3 U.N. SCOR, Supp. May 1948, at 83, 87, U.N. Doc. S/7 4 5
(1948).
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the Israeli Declaration of Independence, not to enforce partition, but to maintain
international peace and security. Its efforts to do so were not effective.52
After the defeat of the Arabs and the occupation by Israel of large areas of
Palestine including parts of Jerusalem, beyond those allotted to it by the General
Assembly resolution, the Arab states expressed their willingness to accept, as a basis
for peace, the original partition proposal including the internationalization of Jeru-
salem, to all of which they had at first objected. Israel had at first accepted this
proposal but now rejected it, insisting that the territory defined by the armistice
belonged to it.53  In view of the Arab acceptance of the original partition proposal,
of the general recognition of Israel as a state, and of its membership in the United
Nations since May 1949, an objection to partition as such is probably not legally valid
in I968. 4
C. Jerusalem
Israel's annexation of Jerusalem appears to be illegal. The original Partition Plan
of the United Nations provided for the internationalization of Jerusalem and this
internationalization was confirmed by an Assembly resolution of December i1, I948,5'
and again by a resolution of December 9, I949,," which entrusted the administration
of the area to the Trusteeship Council. The president of the Council reported to the
General Assembly in June ix5o that Israel and Jordan had refused to cooperate in
the matter, but the Assembly took no action.57  Israel continued to occupy portions
of Jerusalem outside of the wall included within the armistice line of 1949, made
large investments of capital, and established educational and medical institutions in
the area, thus providing a de facto but not a de jure claim. The annexation by Jordan
of old Jerusalem east of the 1949 armistice line was equally contrary to the United
Nations resolutions but has also established a de facto claim. The Arabs at first
11 S.C. Res. 46 of April 17, 1948, affirmed the responsibility of the United Kingdom, so long as it was
the Mandatory Power, to maintain peace and order in Palestine, but called on the Arabs and Jews to
cease all acts of a military or paramilitary nature, all acts of violence or terrorism, and all importation
of arms or armed bands, and to cooperate with the Mandatory Powers. S.C. Res. 48 of April 23, 1948,
established a Truce Commission and the General Assembly on May 14, 1948 authorized the appointment
of a mediator to promote peaceful adjustment of the Palestine situation, and to cooperate with the
Truce Commission. U.N. GAOR, 2d Spec. Sess., Supp. 2, Resolutions, at 5 (1948).
"' The Arab states and Israel accepted, at Lausanne on May 12, 1949, a proposal of the U.N. Concilia-
tion Commission which had been established by G.A. Res. 194 of December 11, 1948 (3 U.N. GAOR,
Resolutions 2r, 22, U.N. Doc. A/81o), and composed of representatives of France, Turkey, and the
United States. The proposal provided for a territorial setdement substantially in accord with the Plan
of Partition with Economic Union. Third Progress Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 4
U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm., Annex, vol. II, at 5, 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/927 (1949). A few days later
Israel made territorial proposals which the Arab delegations considered to be in flagrant violation of the
Protocol. On September 12, 1949, the Commission expressed the opinion that proposals of both sides
exceeded the terms of the Protocol. See General Progress Report . . . of the U.N. Conciliation Com-
mission for Palestine . . . . 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, at 3-4, i9-:2i, U.N. Doc. A/1 3 67/Rev. 1 (1950).
"See note 42 Supra.
"G.A. Res. 194, 3 U.N. GAOR, Resolutions 21, 23, U.N. Doc. A/8so (1948).
56 G.A. Res. 303, 4 id., Resolutions 25, U.N. Doc. A/.:251 (1949).
17Special Report of Trusteeship Council, 5 id., Supp. 9, at a, U.N. Doc. A/z286 (195o); id., Plenary
684 (i95o).
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rejected but later accepted partition as provided in the original United Nations resolu-
tion5" and continued to insist on the internationalization of Jerusalem. The United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union voted against subsequent resolu-
tions in the General Assembly affirming the internationalization of Jerusalem, but
these resolutions were approved by a two-thirds majority, partly because the Latin
American states voted on this issue with other Catholic states, as desired by the
Vatican, rather than with the United States.5 No state seems to have recognized
Israel's annexation of old Jerusalem since June 1967, and the General Assembly has
declared the annexation invalid.60 The status of Jerusalem remains controversial.
The interest of the Christian and Moslem communities of the world, as well as that
of the Jewish community, for full protection of their holy sites in the area, will have
to be satisfied before the issue can be settled.
D. State of War Alleged by Arabs
The claim of the Arab states that they have been in a "state of war" with Israel
since i948 and that, therefore, they exercise belligerent rights which are not contrary
to the terms of the armistices, including closure of the Suez Canal and the Straits of
Tiran to Israeli shipping, is certainly contrary to the obligation of these states under
the United Nations Charter by which both they and Israel are bound.
A state of war in the legal sense, as understood in the i9th century, implied a
situation in which two or more political entities are equally entitled to settle a conflict
by the use of armed force."' It implied a continuing threat by each belligerent to
use force against the other, actual use of force when deemed expedient, and impartial
neutrality by other states. Nineteenth century international law did not limit the
right of a sovereign state to initiate a "state of war" in this sense, although the law
of war imposed limitations upon the methods permissible during the war. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 imposed minor substantive and procedural limitations upon the
initiation of war, and the League of Nations Covenant imposed further restrictions.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929, as interpreted by the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945,
and the United Nations Charter, however, put major limitations upon the use of force
in international relations and "outlawed" a legal "state of war" altogether0 2 The
members of the United Nations are obliged "to settle their international disputes by
" See note 53 supra.
"See, e.g., vote of December 9, 1949, 4 U.N. GAOR 607 (1949).
'0 Note 27 supra.
61 Q. WRoGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 8, 685, 698 (1942). See also Wright, Changes in the Conception
of War, i8 AM. J. INT'L L. 755, 761-67 (1926). F. GROB, TAE RELATIvrrTY OF WAR AND PAcE: A STUDY
rN LAw, HISroRY, AND POLITICS (1949) presents numerous instances in which force was used in interna-
tional relations in various quantities and under various names including "war." He does not dis-
tinguish the factual from the legal conception of war and suggests that the latter conceptionf is so lacking
in clarity that it is useless.
6" Q. WRI T, A STUDY OF WAR 891-92 (1942); The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 Ams. J. INT'L L.
39 (1933); The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 id. 38 (1947); The Outlawry of War and the Law of
War, 47 id. 365 (1953).
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peaceful means" and to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."63
States may, it is true, use force, in "individual or collective self-defense against
armed attack," ' or under authority of the United Nations,65 but in such'circumstances
the belligerents are not equal; one is in principle the aggressor and the other the
defender, and other states may not,.according to the Charter, be neutral. 6 A "state of
war" is, therefore, "outlawed." Israel, as a state and a member of the United Nations,
is recognized under the Charter as the "sovereign equal" of all other members.67 The
Arab states as fellow members of the United Nations cannot, therefore, be in a "state
of war" with it. Israel clearly has the right, under the Charter, to demand that the
Arab states abandon their claim of belligerency against it and their claim that it has
no right to exist.
E. Boundaries
The boundaries of Israel remain undetermined. The United Nations Concilia-
tion Commission at the Lausanne meeting on May i2, 1949, reached agreement with
Arab and Israeli delegations in regard to territorial adjustments and related refugee
rights, but this was later rejected by Israel6" and no agreement has since been reached.
Cease-fire or armistice lines establish possessory rights, so long as they remain valid,
but they da not in principle establish international boundaries. 69 They may do so in
the absence of a boundary treaty or adjudication, by the principles of "prescription"
and of "gtneral recognition." The first of these principles would establish the title
of the occupant up to the cease-fire line if its occupation were not contested by the
state adversely affected for a considerable period of time. Fifty years was accepted
in the British Guiana-Venezuela arbitration of 1899.7° The continuous insistence by
"U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 3 and 4.
"id., art. 51.
"Id., arts. 39, 42.
' Id., art. 2, para. 5.
Id., para. i.
"Cf. note 53 supra.
"Possession of unclaimed territory (territorium nullius) may give good title by the principle of
discovery and occupation, but a possessory right to claimed territory established by a cease fire line, while
protecting against invasion so long as the cease fire agreement remains valid, does not give title and
implies, as did the possessory assizes of Henry 11, in 12th century England, that a procedure to determine
title should be available. See Williams, Sovereignty, Seisin and the League, 7 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 24, 36-
39 (1926); Q. WmiGier, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR 13 (ig6i). The
distinction between a cease fire line and an international boundary was explicitly stated in the 1954 agree-
ment between the French Military Command and Ho Chi Minh which established the cease fire line in
Vietnam as a "provisional military demarcation line" and not an "international boundary." The continuing
validity of this line was doubtful after withdrawal of one party, France, from the responsibilities it had
accepted and violation of the agreement by its successor, Diem. Wright, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam
Situation, supra note 50, at 756-57.
,o See i J. B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST 297 (1906). The William Spader claim (United
States v. Venezuela, RALsTON's REPORT 161 (1904)) was not allowed, the Commissioner saying that "a
right unasserted for over forty-three years can hardly in justice be called a 'claim' " (id. at x6i-6z), and
thirty-two years' prescription was held to bar the Gentini claim (Italy v. Venezuela, id. at 720). Justice
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the Arab states, since the occupation of 1949, that they do not accept the armistice lines
as Israel's boundaries, at least beyond the original United Nations resolution of 1947,
precludes any Israeli title by "prescription" to the enlarged area of Israeli occupation
resulting from the armistices of 1949 or of 1967.
Israel has been "generally recognized" as a state with title to the territory awarded
to it by the United Nations resolution of 1947, which the Arab states were prepared to
accept as a basis for peace in 1949. There seems to be no such "general recognition" of
the additional territory occupied during the hostilities of 1948 or of 1967. Israel's title
to occupied territory beyond that of the United Nations resolution of 1947, therefore,
remains to be determined by agreement with its neighbors or, perhaps, by "general
recognition," manifested by acceptance or acquiescence by most states including the
Arab states, in a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.71
F. Jordan Waters
The Jordan River has tributaries rising in Syria and Lebanon above the Sea of
Galilee, and in Jordan between that Sea and its terminus in the Dead Sea. The lower
part of the river was within Jordan's territory before the June war; it now forms
the boundary between Jordan and the territory occupied by Israel. Proposals by
Israel to divert water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate the Negev, thus depleting the
water available for irrigation in Jordan, and proposals by Syria, Lebanon and Jordan
to divert or utilize the tributaries of the Jordan in their territories, thus depleting the
water available to Israel, have caused continuous controversy and occasional hos-
tiities.7 2
Apart from rights in respect to navigation, international law recognizes the right
of all states in a river basin to an equitable share of the river waters for purposes of
irrigation, domestic uses, and power; to prohibit diversion or pollution by an upper
riparian in violation of equitable claims by lower riparians (on the principle of sic
utere tuum); and to urge agreement among the riparians to determine equitable
sharesa No such agreement has been reached among the states of the Jordan basin
and the above noted proposals for unilateral diversion by Israel and the Arab states
seem to violate the principles of international law on the subject. An international
Field, in the U.S. Supreme Court, denied a boundary claim of Virginia against Tennessee on the ground
that "a boundary line between States ... which has been' run out, located and marked upon the earth,
and afterwards recognized and acquiesced in by the parties for a long course of years, is conclusive, even
if it be ascertained that it varies somewhat from the courses given in the original grant. . . ." Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 522 (1893); quoted portion in W. BisHop, INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND
MArERIALs 363 (2d ed. x962).
't See Wright, Custom as a Basis of International Law in the Post-War World, 2 TEXAs INT'L LAW
FoRUr 147 (x966); 7 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1967).
2See EvERmAN's UsnTan NATioNs, supra note I8, at 75-76.
"'Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, Salzburg, Sept. il, 1961, 49 ANNUAIRE DE L'IN-
STIrr DE DRorr INTERNATIoNAL 370 (ig6I-II). See also Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U.S. 46 (1907);
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (93); 1 G.
HCKWORTIH, DiGasr oF INTERNATioNAL LAw 58o-96 (1940).
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administration with authority, similar to that of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the
United States, to maximize the use and to assure equitable distribution of Jordan
waters for irrigation, power, and other purposes has often been advocated, was recom-
mended in the United Nations partition resolution of 1947, and would. be beneficial
to all the states in the area. Agreement on such an administration is not likely, how-
ever, until the political problems have been solved and tension and hostility between
Israel and its Arab neighbors have been reduced.
G. Refugees
The Arab states have a good claim under international law to repatriation and
compensation for the Arab refugees from Palestine resulting from the hostilities of
1949 and 1967. It is controversial whether the refugees were compelled by Israel to
leave or fled from fear aroused by the Israeli destruction of some villages. The law of
war, applicable to all de facto hostilities, requires the occupant to spare the civil popu-
lation, and refusal to allow repatriation or compensation would violate that law. Nu-
merous efforts to negotiate a settlement for the million refugees resulting from the war
of 1948-49 have been made, and Israel has made some gesture toward compensation.
These refugees have, in fact, been living for nearly twenty years in Jordanian, Egypti-
an, and Syrian territory with support from the United Nations and with little
effort made by the Arab states to resettle them in other parts of the Arab world,
doubtless because the situation is regarded as an asset in keeping world opinion alive
to Arab grievances against Israel. Agreement to solve this problem is of great
importance from humanitarian, legal, and political points of view. The problem
is magnified by new refugees from the areas occupied by Israel in the six-day war.
Under general international law, a state may protest against, and demand repara-
tion for, injury to its nationals by act or negligence of another state in violation of
an obligation under international law. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria may, in accord
with this principle, protest to Israel for injuries to their nationals who fled or were
expelled from territories which belonged to them before the Israel occupations of
1949 .and 1967. Refugees from territory within Palestine, as a result of the 1949
war, were Palestinian nationals and would not be regarded as nationals of neighboring
Arab states even though the nationality laws of those states may have granted
special privileges to "Arabs. 4  These states may, however, properly protest on
humanitarian 5 and human rights76 grounds, and, in so far as the refugees fled or
14Q. WRIGHT, M&NDATES UNDER TE LEAGuE oF NATIONs 327, 462, 468, 528 (i93o); Re Ezra Goral-
shvih (Palestine Supreme Court, 1925), unreported, but summarized by the writer in Wright, Some
Recent Cases on the Status of Mandated Territories, 20 Am. J. INTL' L. 768, 771 (1926).
7 5 Protests have been made in the past against gross inhumanities which "shock the conscience of
mankind" as did the Leopoldian persecutions in the Congo, and Russian and Hitlerian persecution of
Jews even when the injured individuals were subjects of the persecuting state and within its territory.
The Nuremberg trials prosecuted individuals for "crimes against humanity," though only when the
crimes were in pursuance of illegal war or in violation of the war. See Wright, The Law of the
Nuremberg Trial, supra note 62; E. STowLL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-277 (1922).
14 "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," approved by the General Assembly on December io,
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were expelled from Palestine and are not permitted to return to their homes, on
the ground that they constitute a burden on the state of refuge. 7 The United Nations
has a responsibility for refugees on the general basis of denial of human rights and
its support of the Palestinian refugees is an acknowledgment of this responsibility.
H. Suez Canal
Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal to innocent passage by Israeli shipping since
1949 is probably illegal. It has sought to justify this action on the assertion of a
state of war and a duty to protect the Canal. The claim that a "state of war" exists,
as noted above in part IV D, is not valid. The Constantinople Convention of 1888,8
among eight major European states and Turkey, declared that the Canal "shall always
be free and open in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of commerce or of
war without distinction of flag" (article i). This seems to require that the Canal
be open to Israeli vessels even if there were a "state of war," but Egypt claims that
the further provision in the Convention reserving the "rights and immunities" of the
Khedive "not affected by the obligations of the treaty" (article 13) authorized Egypt
to take "measures which it might find necessary to take for securing by their
own forces the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public order" (article ui).
Egypt can properly inspect vessels using the Canal to assure their innocence but
cannot prevent innocent passage of vessels protected by the Convention.
The terms of the Convention, therefore, give no support to Egypt's claims, but
there is also the question whether Israel, not a party to the Convention, can share in
its benefits. The terms of the treaty and practice under it, however, indicate that
freedom to use the Canal was intended to apply to all states. The United Nations
Security Council on September i, i95i, denied the Egyptian claim that a state of war
or defense necessities justified closing the Canal to Israeli shipping and called upon
Egypt to "terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial
1948 (G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, pt. I, Resolutions 7, U.N. Doe. A/8o (1948)), provides in article
13: "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." "The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," approved by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, x966
(GA. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966)), provides in article 12
(p. 54):
"I. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any
country, including his own. 3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order
(ordre public), public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent
with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of the right to enter his own country."
" The German Federal Republic paid reparations to Israel after the Second World War for the
destruction and exile of Jews during the Hider period, some of whom had fled to Palestine. In an inter-
view in March 1968, Nasser said he considered the refugees the most serious Middle Eastern problem.
Attwood, supra note 25, at 61, 64.
78 79 BRIT. & FoR. STATE PAPERS 18 (1887-88); 3 Ass. J. INT'L L. Supp. 123 (1909).
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shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound."79  On October 13,
1956, the Council reaffirmed this position declaring "there should be free and open
transit through the Canal without discrimination overt or covert."" °  President
Eisenhower expressed support for this position on February 20, 1957, .and said:
We should not assume that, if Israel withdraws [from the Sharm el Sheikh area
on the Straits of Tiran], Egypt will prevent Israel's shipping from using the Suez
Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. If, unhappily, Egypt does hereafter violate the Armi-
stice Agreement or other international obligations, then they should be dealt with"
firmly by the society of nations.81
Israel's foreign minister said in March 1957 that this statement had weighed heavily
in reaching the decision that Israel would withdraw its forces behind the 1949
armistice lines.
8 2
On April 24, 1957, Egypt declared that it was "particularly determined . . . to
afford and maintain free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations within the
limits of and in accordance with the provisions of the Constantinople Convention
of 1888" and agreed to submit to the International Court of Justice any dispute on
this issue." Egypt, however, did not permit Israel to use the Canal and Israel
has not invoked the jurisdiction of the Court probably because it does not wish to
raise the issue of the applicability of the Constantinople Convention to non-signatories.
Egypt, however, is probably violating international law in closing the Canal to
Israeli shipping.
Israel occupied the east bank of the Canal as a result of the June war but it has
refused to cooperate in measures which might lead to clearing the Canal of the
71 S.C. Res. 95 (1951); Wright, Interventions, 1956, supra note 48, at 261-72.
"S.C. Res. ix8 (1956).
a 36 DEp'T STATE BULL. 387, 390 (1957). Secretary of State Dulles declared in an aide memoire
to the Israeli Ambassador on February i, 1957 that
"[T]he United States believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation
has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving
access thereto ....
"In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of
justice, the United" States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise
the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this
right."
Id. at 393.
s2 11 U.N. GAOR 1275-76 (1957). See also the position enunciated by Secretary of State Dulles
in the General Assembly (U.N. GAOR, xst Emer. Spec. Sess. io-xz (1956)) introducing the resolution
adopted as G.A. Res. 997, id. Supp. i, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956). It called for a cease fire and
"urged that upon the cease fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure
freedom of navigation." Egypt accepted it "on the condition, of course, that it could not implement
the resolution in case attacking armies continued their aggression." Id., Annexes, Agenda Item no. 5,
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3266 (1956). The resolution was adopted against the opposition of Australia, France,
Israel, New Zealand, and Great Britain, with abstentions by Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal,
and South Africa. U.N. GAOR, ist Emer. Spec. Sess. 34-35 (956).
81i2 U.N. SCOR, Supp. April-June 1957, at 8, 9, 1i, U.N. Doc. S/3818 (957); [1956-1957]
I.C.J.Y.B. 212.
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vessels sunk during the war until Egypt makes a new pledge to open the Canal to
its ships and cargoes84
In December 1967 an agreement was reached through United Nations Ambassador
Jarring permitting survey and clearing of the southern part of the Canal to permit
fifteen foreign vessels, stranded in the center of the Canal, to get out, but Israel
claimed that Egypt began to survey the northern sector of the Canal, contrary to the
agreement. Hostilities ensued, as a result of which Egypt suspended the entire
operation.s5 Israel insisted that Egyptian compliance or non-compliance with this
agreement, the first between the two countries since the armistice, was important
because it would indicate Egypt's general readiness to honor future agreements
with Israel."6 The incident indicated the mutual suspicions that made progress
toward opening the Canal or settlement of other problems difficult.
I. Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran
The legal situation in regard to the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba is
similar to that of the Suez Canal. Under international law, and the Convention of
1958 on the territorial sea, which, however, Egypt has not ratified, international straits
connecting portions of the high seas are open to "innocent passage" by vessels of all
states.8 7  The high seas include seas like the Baltic and the Black Sea with ports
of a number of states, in the absence of agreements by all to make it a mare
clausum. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel all have ports on the Gulf of
Aqaba. The Israeli port of Elath is on the territory within the boundaries of Israel
as provided in the United Nations resolution of 1947. It is, therefore, within Israel's
jurisdiction and makes the Gulf of Aqaba an international sea. Even if the three
Arab states on the Gulf attempted to deny Israel's title to Elath and, by agreement,
attempted to make it a closed sea (mare clausum), it would still be open under the
Convention of 1958 which provides for "innocent passage" through straits used for
international navigation not only between parts of the high seas but also between
the high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign state.
The freedom of the Straits and the Sea of Aqaba was assumed after the
hostilities of 1949 and 1956, particularly by the United States, and the withdrawal
of Israel from the Sinai area was to some extent contingent on this assumption8
Egypt's closure of the Straits in May 1967 was a violation of the rights of Israel as
well as of other states.
8"This purpose was indicated in a letter of January 3r, 1968 from the Israeli Government to the
Secretary-General reiterating its previous refusal to allow the UAR to survey the Canal north of ships
stranded there, and justifying the use of force on the previous day which is referred to in the ensuing
principal text. U.N. Doc. S/ 7 9 3 o/Add.63 , Jan. 3r, 1968, at 14-17.
" N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1968
, 
at I, col. 5.
88 Letter of Jan. 3, 1968, supra note 84.
8 Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.0.]. 4, 28-30. Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 16(4), [x958]
15 U.S.T. 16o6, T.I.A.S. No. 5639; 52 Am. J. INTI' L. 834 (1958).
8 See text accompanying notes 81 and 82 supra.
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J. United Nations Emergency Force
The statu, of the United Nations Emergency Force, which had kept moderate
peace on the Israel-Egyptian frontier for nearly ten years, has been controversial,
but elaborate exposition by Secretary-General U Thant on June 26, 1967, of the
correspondence between Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj6ld and Egypt in
I956 makes it clear that the Force could remain in Egyptian territory only with
the latter's permission. Consequently, the Secretary-General was obliged to withdraw
it when Egypt so demanded in May i967.89 This position was supported by two
states which had contingents in UNEF and prepared to withdraw them at Egypt's
demandf ° The refusal of Israel to allow the United Nations Force to operate on its
side of the cease-fire line in 1956, or in 1967 when the Secretary-General suggested that
it be moved across the line from Egypt," also indicates the need for consent of the
state where such a force is stationed on the basis of a "recommendation" of the
General Assembly. The Security Council seems to have power to make a "decision"
binding on all the members of the United Nations to maintain a force in the territory
of a state when it deems such action necessary as a provisional or an enforcement
measure to maintain international peace and security.92  That power was exercised
in the Congo in i96o, although the original sending of the force to that country was
at the request of the Congo Government0 3
In any case, the sending of the United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle
East was based on a recommendation by the General Assembly, which has no power
to make decisions binding on the members.94 The problem of the United Nations
forces is complicated by the refusal of France, the Soviet Union and other members
to consider the cost of such forces as a charge on the regular budget of the United
Nations to be apportioned among the members of the General Assembly, although
the International Court of Justice held in an Advisory Opinion that it can be so
apportioned.95 This "financial veto" by important countries has, however, made
the maintenance of such forces subject to voluntary contributions.
", See Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, U.N.
Doc. A/6 7 3 o/Add. 3, June 26, 1967; 4 U.N. MONTHLY CHRoN. No. 7, at 135 (1967).
"oMemorandum cited note 89 supra, at paras. 23 and 50.
"'ld., paras. 21, 87-93.
9 Such a power of the Security Council may be inferred in respect to both investigating commissions
and peace-keeping forces from articles 25, 29, 34, 40, 104, and io5 of the Charter. 2 REPERToRY op
PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS art. 29, paras. 17-28; art. 34, paras. 2-14 (1955). See also Q.
WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNrrED NATIONS 122 (196o); COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF PEACE, U.N. GuAsS 9 (Spec. Report 1948); CHARTER REVIEW CONFERENCE 32 (9th Report
1948); STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS 36-38 (xoth Report 1957); ORGANIZING PEACE IN THE
NUCLEAR AGE 42 (iith Report 1959); NEw DIMENSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 27-28 ( 7 th Report
1966).
" Wright, Legal Aspects of the Congo Situation, 4 INT'L STUDIES: JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STrUIES I, 16-22 (1962).
94 x REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS art. 22, paras. 52, 104-107 (1955); STRENGTH-
ENING THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 92, at 5, 36, 79-
'
1 Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para. 2, of the Charter),
[1962] I.C.J. 151.
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K. Withdrawal of Israeli Forces
Israel should eventually withdraw its forces to the armistice lines of 1949 which
constituted its de facto boundary before the six-day war. International law forbids
a state to maintain armed forces in the territory of a foreign state without its
consent, unless authorized by United Nations decision or required by defensive
necessity. The doctrine asserted by Secretary of State Stimson in refusing to recog-
nize any change of rights from the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 in
violation of its obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact was accepted by the
League of Nations, which held that the occupation also violated Japan's obligation
under article io of the Covenant."' The concept of "no fruits of aggression" implying
a duty to withdraw forces from illegally occupied territory has been generally
accepted.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter goes further. It recognizes the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense, in the event of an armed attack, only
"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security." This implies that an occupation of foreign territory, even if
justified as a defensive necessity, must be withdrawn when peace and security have
been restored. Consequently, in the Suez incident of 1956, the United Nations in-
sisted, without deciding who was the aggressor, that the forces of Israel, France and
the United Kingdom in Egyptian territory must be withdrawn under the cease-fire
as the first step in establishing peace.
7
After the Security Council had adopted cease-fire resolutions in the six-day war,
the Soviet Union, supported by France, the Arab states, India and others, demanded
on June 6, 1967, that Israel withdraw from occupied territories. Israel, however,
supported by the United States and others insisted that such a withdrawal be accom-
panied by Arab renunciation of belligerency and perhaps of other polices inconsistent
with international law such as exclusion of Israel shipping through the Suez Canal
and the Straits of Tiran.9
While it is true that the Arab states would be hampered in negotiations as long
as Israel occupied portions of their territory, it would seem that they should be
ready to renounce policies in violation of international law contemporaneously with
Israel's withdrawal. Return to the situation which has led to three Middle Eastern
wars would not seem expedient. A package in which all agreed, not only to accept
their obligations under international law and the United Nations Charter, but also
to act in accordance with these obligations, would seem an essential condition of
peace, as was recognized by the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.
"Wright, The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 342 (1932); LEGAL PROBLEMS
IN THE FAR EASTER. CONFLICT 153-56 (1941); Recognition, Intervention and Ideologies, supra note
42, at 97.
"7 G.A. Res. 997, supra note 82.
s See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.x 3 5 8 (1967).
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L. Role of the United Nations
The responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter is clear. It should,
as it has, demand a cease-fire as a provisional measure 9 and, if hostilities cease as a
result, it should seek to restore international peace and security by achieving agree-
ment among the parties. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly has
power to make a binding decision settling the dispute, but either can make recom-
mendations for settlement if the dispute or situation is one "the continuance of which
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" as 'the
Middle Eastern situation certainly is.'0 0 Either can request Advisory Opinions
from the International Court of Justice to determine legal obligations involved' and
can recommend that the parties submit legal issues to the Court for binding judg-
ment.0 2 The Security Council may decide upon measures to enforce such a judg-
ment.
03
The United Nations has ordinarily made a return to pre-war boundaries part of
a cease-fire demand.' The Soviet Union, the Arab countries, and others believe
that Israel's failure to do so in the present instance constitutes a failure to meet its
responsibilities.
These states also consider that the United Nations has a responsibility to deter-
mine the aggressor in the hostilities.1 5 Such a determination, however, has usually
been avoided because it is thought that it might complicate the problem of restoring
peace. Provisional cease-fire measures are addressed to all belligerents and only if
one or both parties refuse to accept a cease-fire, or after accepting violate its terms,
does the Charter, and practice under it, require a determination of the aggressor.'0°
The fact that both Israel and the Arab states had failed to observe obligations
under the Charter and international law gave a certain justification for the failure of
the United Nations to demand immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the
cease-fire lines of 1949, although it has been recognized that "to conform to sub-
"U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
... Id., arts. 33, 36, 37, 11(2), 14.
10
"1d., art. 96.
0
" ld., art. 36.
... Id., art. 94.
"'Withdrawal was demanded in cease fire resolutions pertaining to Kashmir (S.C. Res. 47 (1948),
S.C. Res. 209 (1965)); Korea (S.C. Res. 82 (1950)); and Suez (G.A. Res. 997, supra note 82). With-
drawal was not demanded in the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965, nor that of Palestine in 1948,
although in the latter situation, S.C. Res. 56 of August ig, 1948 declared that "No party is entitled to
gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce."
... E.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1351, at 21-27, June 8, 1967.
... Such refusal or violation was considered in League of Nations practice to be the best test of
aggression and was incorporated in "The General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War,"
opened for signature on September 26, 193i. x2 LEAGCE OF N^tTo%-s OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 92, at 24
(93). See also Wright, The Concept of Aggression in International Law, 29 Amn. J. IT'L L. 373, 382
(x935); The Prevention of Aggression, 50 id. 514, 530 (956); A STUDY oF WAR, supra note 62. Article
40 of the U.N. Charter contemplates this test. See WRiG;r, THE ROLE OF I.-TERSA5O.AL LAW UN THE
ELIMINATION OF WAR, supra note 69, at 62.
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stantial justice the armistice should be proposed before the fighting has resulted in
any substantial change in the de facto line of occupation and should be based on
that line.' 07
Israel has suggested that the great powers, especially the United States, which
had facilitated Israel's withdrawal of forces from the Aqaba area in 1957 by assuming
that Egypt would open the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to free navigation for
all states including Israel, had a responsibility to take action when Nasser closed the
Straits of Tiran in May 1967."' s President Eisenhower's statement of February 1957
suggested, however, a general interest in assuring Egypt's observance of its interna-
tional obligations, rather than a specific commitment made by the United States to
induce Israel to withdraw its forces. Such a commitment, beneficial to Israel, would
have been contrary to the principle of "no fruits of aggression." Perhaps because
of its involvement in Vietnam, the United States took no action in the 1967 crisis
beyohd a declaration of principle, and the Security Council proved unable to act
because some of the great powers favored Israel and others favored Egypt. Prompt
action to open the Gulf to Israeli shipping might have prevented the war.
M. Determination of Aggression
Inasmuch as a cease-fire was obtained, it was unnecessary and probably un-
desirable for the United Nations to determine the aggressor in the hostilities and
such a determination presented serious difficulties of fact and law.'0 9 Israel claimed
that Egypt's act in closing the Straits of Tiran was a blockade which constituted
an act of war against Israel." ° Egypt's expulsion of the United Nations Emergency
Force, and its mobilization of its own forces in the Sinai area and the Gaza strip
on the Israeli frontier, was said further to indicate its aggressive intentions. Israel
thus claimed that it was the victim of "armed attack" in the broad sense, and was
free to act defensively under article 51 of the Charter. It, however, refused to permit
UNEF to cross the armistice line to its territory. It claimed at first that it did not
actually use armed force against Egypt until the latter had initiated action against it
"
7 Wright, The Concept of Aggression in International Law, supra note xo6, at 394.
.0. Israel Information Service, N.Y. Bulletin, Feb. 5, x968.
109 See note xo6 supra and accompanying text.
1 10 1n announcing the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Aqaba area on March x, 1957, that
country's Foreign Minister said in the General Assembly:
"Interference, by armed force, with ships of Israel flag exercising free and innocent passage
in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits of Tiran, will be regarded by Israel as an attack
entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter and to take all such measures as are necessary to ensure the free and innocent passage of
its ships in the Gulf and in the Straits."
ii U.N. GAOR 1276 (1957). To similar effect see U.N. Doc. A/PV.1536, June i9, 1967, at 42-46. An
official Egyptian report, published on February x9, 1968, stated that President Nasser warned his close
advisers in May 1967 that blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba meant certain war with Israel. N.Y. Times,
March 3, 1968, at 12, col. x.
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on the ground and ii the air, and that defense against Egypt's blockade and the
Arab effort to conquer Israel were its sole goals in using force."' It later admitted,
in effect, that its air attack preceded Egyptian attack on its territory but claimed that
Egypt's aggressive acts justified its attack as necessary defense." 2
Egypt considered that the dosing of the Straits of Tiran and the expulsion of
UNEF were within its domestic jurisdiction; that mobilization was necessary for
defense against Israeli mobilization on the Syrian frontier, of which it allegedly had
intelligence reports; that it had no intention of initiating hostilities, and that it
did not in fact take military action until Israeli air forces had bombed Egyptian
airports, which was followed by simultaneous Israeli action in the Gaza strip, Sinai,
Sharm el Sheikh and other areas. "[T]he dimensions of the Israeli attack are so wide,"
the Egyptian representative in the Security Council said, "that no one can doubt the
premeditated nature of this aggression.""'
Clear evidence of the facts would be important to determine the aggressor, but
it would appear that the well-authenticated acts of Egypt, especially its insistence that
a "state of war" existed and its policy to terminate the existence of Israel, accom-
panied by the closure of the Straits of Tiran and extensive mobilizations on the
Israel frontier, could be regarded as amounting to an "armed attack" on Israel. On
the other hand, Israel's refusal to permit UNEF to cross the armistice line into its
territory, its superior military preparations, its continued occupation of Arab terri-
tory, and its annexation of old Jerusalem, suggest that Israel had intentions other
than defense. Furthermore, its massive air and land attack initiated the war on
June 5. The issue of which was the aggressor may not have to be decided in the
process of restoring peace, but it may arise in subsequent controversies concerning
reparation for injuries received during the hostilities, on the principle that the
... U.N. Doc. S/PV.13 4 7, June 5, 1967, at 17-21.
'See remarks of Premier Eshkol quoted in N.Y. Tunes, July 8, z967, at 4, col. 4. Israel
apologized for its attack on the U.S. intelligence ship Libety on the high seas on June 8, 1967, saying
it thought it was an Egyptian ship. N.Y. Times, June 1o, 1967, at 14, col. 6. Since the prolonged in-
spection of the ship by Israeli aircraft and its clear markings make this explanation improbable, it has
been suggested that Israel hoped to destroy evidence acquired by the ship of Israel's priority in armed
attack on Egypt. LIFE, June 23, x967, at 29.
218 Statements of the U.A.R. Delegation in the Security Council on May 29 and June 5, x967, U.N.
Doe,. S/PV.1343, at 2r-47; S/PV.1347, at 22-30.
Not only priority in initiating hostilities, but also aggressive intentions and superiority of preparation
for attack were considered evidence of the aggressor by the Rumboldt Committee which investigated the
Greco-Bulgarian incident of x925 (see note 114 infra); by the Lytton Commission which investigated
the Manchurian incident of 1931; and by the Nuremberg Tribunal. See Wright, The Concept of
Aggression in International Law, supra note io6, at 380, 386, 388; INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED
NATIoNs, supra note 92, at 89. On the Lytton Commission's suggestion that weight in determining
the aggressor should be attached to the fact that the Japanese were better prepared than the Chinese
when hostilities began on the night of September i8-ig, 1931, the writer commented in 1935:
"Military efficiency may exhibit some correlation with aggressiveness, but it is doubtful whether
the correlation is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the more efficient belligerent is invariably
to be branded as the aggressor."
The Concept of Aggression in International Law, supra note io6, at 381.
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aggressor should be liable to compensate his victims resulting from his act of
aggression." 4
V
SU,MMATION OF LEGAL ISSUES
Reviewing the thirteen legal issues discussed, it appears that Israel was in the
wrong on three: the annexation of Jerusalem, the continued occupation of Arab
territory, and the failure to repatriate or compensate Arab refugees. Arab states were
in the wrong also on three issues: the assertion of a state of war with Israel, refusal
to recognize the latter's right to exist, and the closure of the Suez Canal and the
Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. The Arab claims that the Balfour Declaration
and the partition of Palestine violated their rights were probably originally valid,
but became moot after the general recognition of Israel and its admission to the
United Nations. The issue concerning the status of UNEF also became moot after
its withdrawal, which seems to have been legally necessary. The responsibility of
the United Nations and the Great Powers to insist that the Suez Canal and the
Straits of Tiran be kept open continues, as does the responsibility of the United
Nations to restore international peace and security. On two issues, those concerning
the use of Jordan waters and determination of the boundaries of Israel, both the
Arabs and Israelis have manifested imperfect respect for international law and for
the necessity to reach agreement. On the issue of responsibility for initiating the
six-day war, Egypt made threats and took hostile measures instigating the war, but
Israel's large-scale attack on June 5 started the war. Both may be guilty of
aggression.
VI
PROSPECTS OF THE FUTURE
Little progress toward a settlement of the situation had been made by March 1968
apart from establishing cease-fire lines. The Security Council in November recog-
nized principles of settlement including withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied
territory and Arab renunciation of belligerency, and provided for United Nations
presence in the area for purposes of conciliation. Ambassador Gunnar Jarring has
been seeking a basis for conciliatory action since December 1967. The General
21' The principle was applied in art. 232 of the Treaty of Versailles which required Germany to
make reparation to Belgium for all losses it had suffered as a result of the German invasion in view of
Germany's explicit obligation to Belgium under the neutralization treaty of x839, while reparations to
other countries were in principle based on their losses resulting from German violations of the law of
war. See Wright, The Outlawry of Wfar, ig Am. J. INT'L L. 76, 86 (1925). See also Articles of Inter-
pretation of the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact): "A violating state is liable to pay compensation for
all damage caused by a violation of the Pact to any signatory state or to its nationals." INT'L L. Ass'm,
REPORT OF THiRTY-EiGHTH CO.,FEREN.CE 1, 66, 68 (London 1934). Greece, found to be the aggressor
in the Greco-Bulgarian incident of 1925, was required to make reparation for Bulgarian losses. See 3 7 th
Sess. of the Council, sath meeting, 7 LEAGUE OF NATioNs OFF. J. 172 (1925). See also Wright, The
Outlawry of War and the Law of War, supra note 62.
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Assembly has declared that Israel should renounce its annexation of Jordanian Jeru-
salem.
The Arabs have refused to negotiate and have strengthened their military position
by importing Soviet arms, gaining assistance of Soviet advisers and benefiting by
the presence of Soviet naval force in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel has declared
the annexation of old Jerusalem, has refused to evacuate the occupied territories,
at least until other issues are settled, and hopes for the support of the United States,
which also has naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean. The United States, how-
ever, has been seeking to maintain an impartial position by urging settlement of the
refugee problem and asserting that Israel's withdrawal from occupied areas must
be contingent on Egyptian renunciation of belligerency, recognition of Israel, and
opening of the waterways. It also has sought to maintain the military balance of
power by giving arms to both Israel and Jordan.
Sporadic hostilities have occurred on the Syrian, Jordanian and Suez frontiers in
violation of the cease-fire agreements, as well as by Arab guerrillas inside the
occupied territories. The Suez Canal continues blocked and another round of major
hostilities between Israel and the Arabs, which might escalate into general war, seems
likely unless effective international action, preferably through the United Nations,
breaks the deadlock.
It has been suggested that termination of Vietnam hostilities might induce the
Soviet Union and the United States to exert influence in common toward realization
of the Security Council resolution of November 22, i967. Both of the superpowers
seem anxious to continue their ditente, which has been hampered by the Vietnam
intervention, and to establish peace in the Middle East. The ambivalence of their
Middle Eastern policies in the past is notable. Both accepted the Balfour Declaration
and the British Mandate for Palestine, and the Soviet Union promptly followed the
United States in recognition of Israel in May x948. They were together in supporting
the United Nations cease-fire in 1956, and in insisting upon withdrawal of the
British and French forces, and the evacuation by Israel of the territories it had
occupied, as the first step toward settlement of the Suez problem.
However, after the United States had affronted Arab opinion by the Eisenhower
doctrine of I957,115 thought by the Arabs to manifest United States support of im-
perialism and Zionism, the Soviet Union has manifested a pro-Arab position, par-
2 This doctrine, by declaring that "The United States is prepared to use armed force to assist
any such [Middle Eastern] nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression
from any country controlled by international communism" (71 Stat. 5 ('957)), convinced the Arab
countries, which had just experienced aggression, not from International Communism but from Israel,
Great Britain, and France, that the United States had changed its policy which had opposed the latter
aggressions. Only Lebanon, under a western-orientd government, among the Arab states accepted the
Eisenhower doctrine, and that government was changed by revolution in z958 partly because of this
position conflicting with the Arab policy of "neutralism." See Wright, United Staes Intervention in
the Lebanon, supra note 5o, at 124. For further discussion of the Eisenhower Doctrine, see 5 M.
Wm-rEM A, DIoGsr oF INrERNArsorm. LAw 1137-56 (z965).
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ticularly after communist-oriented parties had developed, especially in Syria and
Iraq.
The United States has usually sought to be impartial in the Middle Eastern
controversies. It has been anxious to maintain friendly relations with the Arabs
because of the interest of American corporations in Middle Eastern oil and a general
interest in peace, but domestic politics have urged a pro-Israel policy because of the
extensive Zionist influence in such critical areas as New York City. Furthermore,
the cold war obsession of Americans has induced the Government to oppose the
Soviet Union and Middle Eastern states which accept Soviet aid. After the Soviet
Union had given financial and technical support to Egypt to build the Aswan Dam,
following United States repudiation of its offer to give such support in June 1956,
United States antagonism to Egypt increased.t"
The positions of Great Britain and France have also been ambivalent. Great
Britain has favored the Jewish national home in Palestine, developed it as Mandatory
Power for nearly thirty years, and was responsible for placing the serious situation
which had developed in 1947 before the United Nations for solution. This resulted
in partition of Palestine as desired by the Zionists at that time. Great Britain was
also responsible for intervention in Egypt following Israel's invasion in 1956. It has,
however, supported the Arab League and the independence of Arab states.
France was allied with Israel and Britain against Egypt in the intervention of
1956 and had followed a pro-Israeli policy until the recent crisis during which it
has tended to support the Arab position.
The position of the Great Powers, therefore, seems somewhat flexible and elements
in the situation of both Israel and the Arabs militate against excessive rigidity. Arab
nationalism, especially Egyptian nationalism, urges avoidance of excessive dependence
upon the Soviet Union for arms, and experience in the three wars with Israel sug-
gests caution in getting into another. Some Arab countries such as Tunisia and to
a lesser degree Jordan have urged accommodation with Israel.
Israel had a population, within the 1949 armistice lines, which included a majority
of oriental Jews most of whom speak Arabic, who feel discriminated against by the
government, controlled by European and American Jews, and who, with the two
hundred thousand resident Arabs, have favored accommodation with Arab neigh-
bors. 1 7  It, therefore, would face a serious domestic problem if it attempted to
assimilate the recently occupied areas with more than half a million Arabs. If these
... See text accompanying note 21 stupra. President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that the
Aswan loan was withdrawn because the Soviet offer was "blackmail" and that arms were refused to
Israel to balance those sent to Egypt by the Soviet Union for the same reason. Dwio'r D. EzsaNuowEaR,
THE WHE HOUSE YEsAS: WAGING PEACE 1956-1956, at 25, 31 (1965). See also ANTHoNy EDEN, FULL
CIRCLE 470 (z96o).
"" They professed their solidarity with Israel during the six-day war and appeared to support retention
of the occupied areas by Israel, but complained of discrimination in Israel's immigration and welfare
policies. See Israel's Oriental Problem, a monthly bulletin distributed by the Council of the Sephardi
Community, vol. 3, no. 1, at 4-5 (1967).
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areas were retained with their present inhabitants, apart from the issue of legality,
the western Jews now in control would be a minority of the population of Israel
especially if, as has been suggested, the refugee problem were liquidated by settling
all the refugees in these areas. If these areas were accorded a semi-colonial status, Israel
would jeopardize its claim to be a democracy unless a true federation-of the Arab
area with Jewish Israel could be effected. If the present population of the recently
occupied areas were deported or driven out, the refugee problem would be accentuated
and world opinion would be shocked. Annexation of Jerusalem was shocking to
Christian and Moslem opinion as indicated by the large majority in the General
Assembly opposing it. It seems doubtful whether the strategic advantages of
holding the recently occupied territories can compensate for the internal and external
difficulties Israel would encounter.
The suggestion that Jews abroad should not be admitted to Zionist organizations
unless they promise to migrate to Israel within five years would not only militate
against favorable support for Israel among American Jews, who do not usually wish
to migrate, but suggests an effort to maintain a majority of westernized Jews to
neutralize the influence of the Oriental Jews" 8 and the Arabs in Israel, perhaps to
fill the recently occupied areas if their inhabitants are expelled.
Both the Jews and the Arabs would undoubtedly benefit by reaching an accommo-
dation and establishing peace in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, the United
States and the world would all profit by eliminating the escalating possibilities of
Middle Eastern hostilities. The Security Council's unanimous recommendation, on
November 22, 1967, of a settlement, based on mutual recognition of the legal rights
of both Israel and the Arabs, indicates a first step. A further step has been sug-
gested by the leaders of the Oriental Jewish Community in Israel. They have pro-
posed establishment of an "autonomous Palestinian Arab Entity in the occupied area
in which all the refugees would be settled."" 9  Many of the refugees of 1948 and
1949 are already there. A federation of Israel with such a Palestinian Arab state
and perhaps with Jordan was proposed but considered impracticable in 1947. But
political independence of these states with economic union was recommended by the
United Nations and accepted by the Zionists in 1947 and, after military defeat in
1949, by the Arabs. Return to this proposal, repudiated by the victorious Zionists in
1949, might be considered. 2
"
11 d.
Ila Id. at 7-8.
1 0 Cf. note 53 supra.
